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1 Though the issuance of standalone CSR reports is involuntary in Canada, standalone CSR 
reports are mandatory for public corporations in Sweden, Norway, the Netherlands, Denmark, 
France and Australia (Frost, 2007).   
Abstract 
This research examines whether firms who issue these reports are really more socially 
responsible or if they are merely trying to convince stakeholders that they are. We use the 
CSID index as an independent evaluation of firms’ level of CSR and find that firms that issue 
standalone CSR reports every year do have significantly higher Total CSR, CSR Strengths and 
CSR Weaknesses than firms that never issue these reports. Additionally, we find that firms that 
issue standalone CSR reports in some years have higher Total CSR and CSR Strengths scores 
than firms that never issue standalone CSR reports. Our results provide support for the 
explanation that firms who issue standalone CSR reports do so as a signal of their superior 
commitment to social responsibility actions. We found minimal support for the argument that 
firms who issue standalone CSR reports are more profitable. 
Keywords:  Corporate Social Responsibility, Sustainability Reports  
Introduction 
Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR) refers to a firms’ impact on the environment 
and on society beyond the role of maximizing profitability (Crane, McWilliams, 
Matten, Moon, and Siegel, 2008). Unlike the regulations for the reporting of public 
firms’ financial information, the reporting of a firm’s environmental and social 
information in Canada is not mandatory1 (Bebbington, Larrinaga, and Moneva., 2008). 
The lack of mandatory reporting and certification requirements results in information 
asymmetry about firms’ CSR practices.  Information asymmetry means that 
stakeholders cannot distinguish between those firms that are good corporate citizens 
and those that are not (Gugerty, 2009).  In the face of information asymmetry, one 
way that firms can communicate to stakeholders that they are good corporate citizens 
is to voluntarily issue standalone CSR reports. 
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Voluntary disclosure of standalone CSR reports is on the rise over the past decade 
(Bebbington et al., 2008; Erusalimsky, Gray, and Spence, 2006). For instance, 
CorporateRegister.com reports that the issuances of voluntary standalone CSR Reports 
in Canada has grown from only Dow Chemical Canada Inc. issuing standalone CSR 
reports for the years 1989 and 1990 to over 177 firms issuing standalone reports 
covering the year 2008. KPMG International (2011) found that nearly 95%of the 
largest 250 companies in the world are now issuing these standalone reports.  As a 
result of this growth in issuing standalone CSR reports, there is a need to understand 
why companies choose to issue these reports on their sustainability efforts and issues 
(Adams, 2002; Bebbington et al., 2008).  
The recent increase in voluntary reporting of CSR is most likely due to the result of 
growing pressure from both internal and external stakeholders for firms to be good 
corporate citizens (Ballou, Heitger, Landes, and Adams, 2006). On the one hand, 
engaging in and reporting CSR activities can impose costs on a firm, and to the extent 
that rivals fail to participate, a firm’s competitive position in the marketplace may 
suffer (Baron, 2001). On the other hand, some benefits accrue to good corporate 
citizens. For example, prior research has shown that firms that are known to have a 
genuine commitment to CSR are subject to beneficial consumer behavior (Marin, 
Ruiz, and Rubio, 2009), attraction and retention of employees (Greening and Turban, 
2000; Turban and Greening, 1997), positive investment (Sen, Bhattacharya, and 
Korschun, 2006) and greater profitability (Orlitzky, 2008).  Thus, a firm may choose 
voluntarily to issue a standalone CSR report to project an image that the company is 
socially aware and environmentally friendly (Guidry and Patten, 2010). 
Standalone reports and other forms of voluntary disclosure are based on the premise 
that managers of firms wish to disclose additional information in the hopes that the 
stakeholders interpret such information as favorable to the company. According to 
PricewaterhouseCoopers (2002), managers believe that a major benefit of issuing 
standalone CSR reports is reputation enhancement. These findings are confirmed by 
KPMG International (2008) who noted that brand enhancement and reputation were 
the major reasons for issuing these reports. While some firms may present reliable 
standalone CSR reports, other firms may take advantage of information asymmetry 
and the lack of regulation to project a commitment to pro social and environment 
practices, which may not be entirely accurate (Lyon and Maxwell, 2011). In other 
words, CSR standalone reports may be used as a signal of a good corporate citizenship 
or may be used as a form of greenwashing. Greenwashing is a disinformation strategy 
made possible by information asymmetry due to lack of mandatory reporting 
standards for CSR (Lyon and Maxwell, 2011). Critical to the interpretation of 
standalone CSR reports is the need to unravel the extent to which CSR reports can be 
relied upon.  Along with providing an understanding of the motivation for firms to 
issue standalone reports, insight into this understanding will be useful in determining 
the necessity for additional mandatory disclosures and for certification of standalone 
CSR reports. 
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This paper is organized into four sections. The first section develops the hypotheses.  
The second and third sections outline our methodology and results. The last section 
contains our summary and conclusion.  
Hypotheses Development 
Consistent with a theoretical explanation that has been previously used in the CSR 
reporting literature, there are two possible reasons that firms choose to voluntarily 
issue standalone CSR reports (Dawkins and Ngunjiri, 2008). Firms can issue 
voluntary standalone CSR reports to differentiate themselves from other firms that do 
not issue standalone reports by signaling to stakeholders that they are engaging in 
good corporate behavior (Gugerty, 2009). This explanation is consistent with signaling 
theory, which suggests that firms are voluntarily disclosing social and environmental 
information to communicate their superior positions regarding CSR activities (c.f., 
Healy and Palepu, 2001) and thereby directly signaling the firms’ values for 
promoting CSR. Firms may also use voluntary standalone reports as a form of green 
washing, to misrepresent their corporate social performance by posing as “friends of 
the environment and leaders in the struggle to eradicate poverty” when they are not, in 
fact, good corporate citizens (Greer and Bruno, 1996). This latter explanation is 
consistent with legitimacy theory, which suggests that firms are voluntarily disclosing 
information to promote an impression of legitimacy in terms of social and 
environmental values, which (more often than not) may not be substantiated. 
According to both signaling and legitimacy theoretical perspectives, voluntary CSR 
reporting arises in part as a response to imperfections in the market for firm 
accountability.  Information asymmetry between firms and their stakeholders is a 
major result of these imperfections (Gugerty, 2009). Since stakeholders cannot easily 
observe firms’ CSR activities, firms faced with this dilemma may need to provide 
some credible signal of their virtue (Verrecchia, 1983). As a result, firms will 
undertake voluntary disclosure when the benefits of providing standalone CSR reports 
outweigh the associated costs.  
On one hand, signaling theory is based on the premise that in the absence of 
information, under information asymmetry, stakeholders will assume the worst 
(Milgrom, 1981). Therefore, firms that have made a substantive commitment to CSR 
will benefit from the issuing of standalone CSR reports, while firms that have not 
made a substantive commitment to CSR will not benefit. Signaling theory suggests 
that the firm’s stakeholders use various clues, provided by a firm in its voluntary 
disclosures, to draw conclusions about the firm’s intentions or actions (Srivastava and 
Lurie, 2001).   
According to signaling theory, the standalone CSR report acts to signal a good 
corporate citizen because it mitigates the information asymmetry surrounding firms’ 
CSR by providing information in the social and environmental domain. Since “bad” 
corporate citizens should find it more costly to present a standalone CSR report, as 
compared to a “good” corporate citizen, the standalone CSR report itself will act as a 
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signal of good corporate behavior. Prior lawsuits (Nike-Kasky Case, 2002) suggest 
that there are additional costs imposed on bad firms that choose to issue standalone 
CSR reports.  This suggests that firms with “good” social and environmental news 
would have a greater incentive to issue voluntary standalone CSR reports than firms 
with “bad” social and environmental records, thus biasing the reporting of standalone 
reports toward those with “good news” to tell on the CSR front (Lizzeri, 1999).  
On the other hand, according to legitimacy theory (Cho, Guidry, Hageman, and 
Patten, 2010; Cho and Patten, 2007; Patten, 1992; Brown and Deegan, 1998; Deegan, 
Rankin, and Tobin, 2002), firms use CSR disclosures to provide favorable pictures of 
their commitment to society and the environment by emphasizing their positive 
actions and mitigating their negative actions (Lindblom, 1994). The legitimacy theory 
perspective suggests that firms voluntarily incur costs to issue standalone reports and 
engage more in corporate political activity (Cho, Patten and Roberts, 2006)  when 
firms wish to “greenwash” information so that their stakeholders believe that they are 
good.  Greenwashing is the issuing of false or misleading information on social and 
environmental issues. Greenwashing is made possible when stakeholders cannot 
distinguish between firms that are actually good corporate citizens and those that are 
only posing as friends of the environment and society (Greer and Bruno, 1996).  
Recent events, however, suggest that there are costs imposed on firms if it is 
discovered that they engage in greenwashing. For example, prior to 2002, Nike issued 
standalone CSR reports that included false claims regarding labor practices of its 
subcontractors in the third world. When the claims were subsequently proven false, 
legal action was taken against Nike, which was subsequently settled when the 
company (Nike-Kasky Case, 2002) agreed to pay $1.5 million to a labor standard 
organization.  Immediately after the settlement was reached, Nike stopped producing 
its standalone report for three years. In 2005, Nike started once again to voluntarily 
issue its standalone CSR reports, and has been presented as an industry leader due to 
its extremely high levels of transparency and disclosure (Murray, 2005).   
According to Legitimacy theory, voluntary CSR disclosures may not correspond with 
actual social performance and may not be substantively based (Cho and Patten, 2007: 
Cho, Patten and Roberts, 2010, Cho, Freedman, and Patten, 2012). Empirical findings 
adopting a legitimacy perspective are mixed (Patten, 2002). One possible explanation 
for the mixed findings is due to the methodological shortcomings in the extant 
research, which include small sample size, failure to control for industry differences, 
and firm size2 (e.g. Cho and Patten, 2007). Alternatively, the mixed findings may be 
due to the inapplicability of the legitimacy perspective as a basis for understanding 
CSR disclosures.   
Signaling theory predicts that the voluntary disclosure of CSR information may be an 
attempt to signal company values with respect to social and environmental issues. 
Prior research on the levels of CSR disclosure by Gelb and Strawser (2001) finds a 
2 In a more recent study, Cho and Patten (2007) found a difference in the amount of CSR 
disclosure according to a firms’ level of CSR when controlling for industry and firm size.   
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positive relationship between disclosure level and CSR. This study also found that 
firms with higher CSR scores have more extensive disclosures. In a study of U.K. 
firms, Toms (2002) also found a positive relationship between levels of CSR 
disclosures and measures of corporate reputation. Given that measures of CSR tend to 
rely on publicly available information, signaling theory predicts that firms who issue 
standalone CSR  
Reports do so because revelation of their positive CSR practices will reap benefits. If 
firms use voluntary CSR reports to signal to stakeholders their superior social and 
environmental performance, then we would expect that CSR scores would be higher 
for firms that provide voluntary CSR reports than for firms that do not. This gives rise 
to the following hypothesis, which is consistent with a signaling theory perspective: 
H1:  CSR scores are higher for firms that issue standalone CSR reports than for 
firms that do not. 
H1a: CSR scores are higher for firms that issue standalone CSR reports every 
year than for firms that do not 
H1b: CSR scores are higher for firms that issue standalone CSR reports in some 
of the years than for firms that never issue standalone CSR reports. 
Support of H1 would be consistent with signaling theory, while lack of support for H1 
would be more consistent with a legitimacy explanation. Signaling theory predicts an 
actual difference in CSR scores between firms that issue standalone reports and firms 
that do not, while legitimacy theory predicts no difference. It follows that support for 
H1 would suggest that firms that voluntarily issue standalone CSR reports do so to 
signal their stronger CSR commitment, and lack of support for H1 would suggest that 
firms with standalone CSR reports may be greenwashing.  
A signaling perspective suggests that firms issue standalone CSR reports only when 
their “good news” outweighs the “bad news”, which could include the costs of 
environmental cleanup, costly litigation and other compliance costs (Verrecchia, 1983; 
Li, Richardson, Thornton and Hughes, 1997). When the “bad news” outweighs the 
“good news”, firms would tend not to signal. Thus, a signaling perspective suggests 
that firms that issue standalone CSR reports may be more likely to have higher CSR 
Strengths than firms that do not issue standalone CSR Reports, and also would tend to 
have Higher CSR Strengths than Weaknesses.   
This is in contrast to a legitimacy perspective (Cho and Patten, 2007; Patten, 1992; 
Brown and Deegan, 1998; Deegan et al., 2002), where firms would use voluntary 
standalone CSR reports to overstate their actual positive action and/or omit or 
understate their negative actions (Lindblom, 1994). According to Gray (2006), many 
companies choose to focus only on positive aspects of their CSR, and fail to disclose 
CSR Weaknesses. According to a legitimacy perspective, we would anticipate higher 
CSR Strengths and lower CSR Weaknesses in firms that choose to issue standalone 
CSR reports than those that do not.  
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CSR and Financial Performance 
A substantial body of empirical evidence into the association between CSR and 
financial performance (FP) indicates that on the balance, there is a positive association 
between CSR and firm profitability (Clarkson, Li, Richardson and Vasvari, 2011; 
Orlitzky, 2008; Van der Laan, Van Ees and Van Witteloostuijn, 2008). Signaling 
theory not only predicts that the voluntary disclosure of CSR information may be an 
attempt to signal company values with respect to social and environmental issues, but 
also signal that the company is committed to eliminating information asymmetry and 
that the company is well managed (e.g. Alexander and Buchholz, 1978; Waddock and 
Graves, 1997). A well run firm is more likely to be profitable than one that is not, and 
a company with good FP allows firms to redistribute from shareholders to other 
stakeholders and pay attention to social and environmental issues (Baron, 2001).  
Orlitzky (2008) suggests that a positive association between ROA and CSR may 
signal enhanced organizational reputation and increased sales revenues. Moreover, 
signaling theory would suggest that the issuing of standalone CSR reports may be an 
attempt by firms to signal profitability, as these firms are better able to bear the 
incremental costs associated with the issuing of standalone CSR reports than those that 
do not issue standalone CSR reports. As a result, a firm that produces voluntary 
standalone CSR reports may be using it to indirectly signal profitability. 
If firms use standalone CSR reports to signal to stakeholders that they are committed 
to mitigating information asymmetry and are better run than those firms that do not 
issue standalone CSR reports, then we would expect a stronger association between 
CSR scores and profitability for firms that issue standalone CSR reports than in firms 
that do not. For those firms issuing standalone CSR reports, we anticipate firms with 
higher overall CSR scores would be more profitable than firms with lower CSR 
scores.  Accordingly, our second hypothesis is that those firms with standalone CSR 
reports are likely to have a strong positive association between CSR and FP, while 
those firms that do not issue CSR have a spurious association between CSR and FP. 
This gives rise to the hypotheses 2: 
H2 :  The relationship between CSR and FP is stronger for firms that issue 
standalone CSR reports than firms that do not. 
H2a : The relationship between CSR and FP is stronger for firms that issue 
standalone CSR reports every year than those firms who do not.  
H2b : The relationships between CSR and FP is stronger forms firms that issue 
standalone CSR reports in some of the years compared to firms that never issue 
standalone CSR reports.   
Support for these hypotheses would be consistent with the signaling theory 
explanations, as these firms are disclosing their actual superior performance. Lack of 
support for these hypotheses would be consistent with legitimacy theory indicating 
that firms who issue standalone CSR reports may or may not be better managed, are 
engaging in greenwashing, and may or may not have higher profitability. 
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Methodology 
Sample Selection 
Our sample was obtained from the CSID database. The CSID database was developed 
in 1992 by Michael Jantzi Research Associates and scores firms on their corporate 
social responsibility actions. CSR scores are determined by MJRA through research 
that includes interviews, surveys, analysis of litigations and legislative actions, and 
analysis of public and private documents. The CSID database contains CSR social 
profiles on over 250 publicly traded Canadian companies. For a company to be 
included in our analysis, CSR scores needed to be available for the company for each 
year from 2003 through 20083. This resulted in a total of 120 companies in our 
sample, totaling 720 observations over the span of six years.   
Independent Variable 
Measurement of CSR 
In consistency with other research, CSR scores are measured by using the ratings in 
the CSID index developed and maintained by Michael Jantzi Research Associates Inc. 
(MJRA) (Thorne, Mahoney and Bobek,2010; Mahoney and Roberts, 2007; Mahoney 
and Thorne, 2006)4. The CSID index, developed by MJRA, Inc., is an independent 
rating on a firm’s various dimensions of CSR. The ratings are determined by screening 
criteria applied consistently across a wide range of companies and are largely 
objective (Mahoney and Roberts, 2007; Mahoney and Thorne, 2006). Information is 
gathered from different data sources, both internally and externally, including 
investment analysts’ reviews of corporate documents, company’s annual reports, 
annual information forms and proxy information circulars. Firms’ environmental 
policies, health and safety policies, and codes of business conduct are also evaluated, 
along with information from government, labor, industry, and non-profit 
organizations. (For further information, see Mahoney and Roberts, 2007). Finally, 
interviews are performed, including interviews with important stakeholders, company 
and industry executives, community groups, environmental organizations, government 
and regulatory representatives, and union representatives (MJRA, 2000).  
The CSID index rates each company across several dimensions within the categories 
of environment, customers, employees, corporate governance, community and human 
rights.  Each of these dimensions is given two ratings; a strength rating and a 
weakness rating.  These ratings range from two to zero. A rating of 2 represents a 
3  Effective in 2009, MJR began to report CSR information in their new Global Platform. Thus, 
comparable CSR scores after 2008 are not available.   
4  This multidimensional database measuring CSR for Canadian firms was developed in 1992 
by Michael Jantzi Research Associates, Inc. (MJRA), and specializes in the assessment of CSR 
for Canadian corporations. Ratings for the CSID are determined by MJRA through extensive 
research, including public and private documents, interviews, surveys, analysis of litigations 
and legislative actions. The CSID database specializes in the assessment of CSR for Canadian 
corporations and contains social profiles of over 400 publicly traded Canadian companies, 
including the companies on the Toronto Stock Exchange (TSE) 300 Index. 
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major strength or major weakness, a rating of 1 indicates some strength or weakness, 
while a rating of 0 indicates no strengths or no weaknesses. A score for CSR 
Weaknesses is calculated by summing the weakness ratings across all dimensions, 
while a score for CSR Strengths is calculated by summing the strengths ratings across 
all the dimensions. The Total CSR score is calculated by taking CSR Strengths and 
subtracting CSR Weaknesses. 
Dependent Variables 
Standalone CSR Reports 
CorporateRegister.com is estimated to have over ninety percent of the world’s 
standalone CSR reports published online (CorporateRegister.com, 2008). Of the 120 
companies, we found that 23 companies issued standalone CSR reports in each of the 
six years, 24 companies issued standalone CSR reports in some of the six years, and 75 
companies never issued a standalone CSR reports in any of the years between 2003 
and 2008. 
Financial Performance 
Return on assets (ROA) is used to measure FP for a firm (Fauzi, Mahoney and 
Rahman, 2007). In consistency with prior research, a one-year lag of CSR is used to 
examine the relationships between FP and CSR (Waddock and Graves, 1997; Roman, 
Hayibor, and Agle, 1999; Mahoney and Roberts, 2007).  The Compustat database was 
used to obtain information on each firm’s ROA.  
Measurement of Control Variables 
To control for differences in the relationships between CSR and FP that have been 
noted in other research, we control for debt level (debt-to-assets), firm size (Total 
Assets), and industry (firm sector) (Craighead, Magnan and Thorne, 2004:Mahoney 
and Roberts, 2007; Graves and Waddock, 1994; Waddock and Graves, 1997). Industry 
sectors are represented by dummy variables and are broken down by industry sector. 
Compustat was used to obtain information on debt-to-assets and total assets.  Industry 
sector was obtained from the MJA database.  
The Model 
Hypothesis 1 posits that CSR is higher for firms that issue standalone reports than for 
firms that do not. Hypothesis 1a posits that CSR is higher for firms that issue 
standalone CSR reports every year compared to firms who do not. Hypothesis 1b 
posits that CSR is higher for firms that issue standalone CSR reports in some of the 
years compared to firms that never issue standalone CSR reports. To test Hypothesis 1, 
1a, and 1b, we performed an ANOVA between firms that issue standalone CSR reports 
every year, firms that issue standalone CSR reports in some years, and firms that never 
issue standalone CSR reports across three measures of CSR: Total CSR, CSR 
Strengths and CSR Weaknesses.   
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Hypothesis 2 posits that the association between CSR and FP is stronger for firms that 
issue standalone CSR reports compared to those firms who do not. Hypothesis 2a 
posits that the association between CSR and FP is stronger for firms that issue 
standalone reports ever year than for firms that do not. Finally, Hypothesis 2b posits 
that the same association is stronger for firms that issue standalone reports in some of 
the years compared to firms who never issue reports. We test Hypothesis 2, 2a, and 2b 
using the following equation that includes a dummy variable for Report.  For 
Hypothesis 2, the value of Report is 1 if a firm issues a standalone CSR Report and 0 
otherwise. For Hypothesis 2a, the value of Report is 1 for firms that issue standalone 
CSR reports every year and 0 otherwise. For Hypothesis 2b, the value of Report is 1 
for firms that issue standalone CSR reports in some of the years and 0 otherwise. To 
specifically test H2, the interaction term Match*ROA is included to capture whether 
there is a significant difference in the association between ROA and CSR between 
firms to specifically test these hypothesis. The following regression equation is used: 
CSRi,t+1 =  0 + 1ROAit + 2Reportit + 3 ROAit*Reportit+4Debt-to-Assetsit +  
5Assetsit +                              6 + εit     (1) 
 
Where 
i  = firm  
t = year (2003 through 2008) 
CSR = Corporate Social Responsibility Score for Total, Strengths and 
Weaknesses 
ROA = Return on Assets  
Report = H2-1 if a firms issues a standalone CSR report or 0 otherwise; H2a- 1 
if firm issues standalone CSR report every year or 0 otherwise; H2b-1 if 
a firm issues a standalone CSR report in some of the year and 0 
otherwise 
Debt-to-Assets= Total Debt/Total Assets  
Assets  = Total Assets in Millions 
Industryk = 1 if industry sector k; 0 otherwise; k = 1, 2… 10 (number of sectors 
minus one) 
εit are independent, normally distributed error terms with mean 0 and variance σ2 
The significance of the interaction variable of Report*ROA would suggest support for 
each hypothesis. 
Results 
Descriptive Statistics 
Table 1 shows the mean, standard deviation and correlation statistics for all firms in 
our sample.  For all firms, the average Total CSR, CSR Strengths, and CSR 
Weaknesses scoresare .049, .835, and .786 respectively. The average ROA is 3.46.  
ROA and Total Assets are significantly positively related to Total CSR and Debt-to-
Assets is significantly negatively related to Total CSR at p<.01.  Debt-to-Assets is 
k
itIndustry
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significantly positively correlated to CSR Weaknesses at p<.05 and CSR Strengths at 
p<.01, while Total Assets is only significantly positively correlated with CSR 
Strengths at p<.01.     
Table 1. Correlations for All Firms 
Variable  Mean SD Total 
Assets 
Debt-to-
Assets 
ROA CSR 
Weaknesses 
CSR 
Strengths 
Total Assets $27,424 $76.863           
Debt-to-Assets 57.7% .221 -.491*         
ROA 3.46 9.66 -.066 -.049       
CSR 
Weaknesses 
.786 .890 -.019 .084** .061     
CSR Strengths .835 1.014 .279* .230* -.048 .002   
Total CSR .049 1.347 .223* -.118* .077** -.659* .751* 
*p < .01   
**p < .05 
Table 2 shows the mean, standard deviations and correlation statistics for firms that 
issue standalone CSR reports every year. The average Total CSR, CSR Strengths, and 
CSR Weaknesses scores are .272, 1.272 and 1.0 respectively, and all are higher than 
the averages for the total sample. Total Assets and Debt-to-Assets are significantly 
positively related to CSR Strengths and Total CSR at p<.01, and are negatively related 
to CSR Weaknesses at p<.05 and p<.01 respectively.  ROA is significantly negatively 
related to CSR Strengths and Total CSR at p<.01.  
Table 2. Correlations for All Firms that Issue Standalone CSR Reports Every 
Year 
Variable Mean SD Total 
Assets 
Debt- to- 
Assets 
ROA CSR 
Weaknesses 
CSR 
Strengths 
Total Assets  $92,190 $125,424           
Debt-to-Assets 69.1% .197 .806*         
ROA 4.980 5.676 -.461* -.635*       
CSR 
Weaknesses 
1.000 1.056 -.202** -.253* .020     
CSR Strengths 1.272 1.056 .402* .445* -.357* -.205***   
Total CSR .272 1.640 .389* .450* -.243* -.776* -.777* 
*p < .01 
**p < .05 
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Table 3 shows the mean, standard deviations and correlation statistics for firms that 
issue standalone CSR report in some of the years. The average Total CSR, CSR 
Strengths and CSR Weaknesses scores are .449, 1.101 and .652 respectively. The 
Total CSR and CSR Weaknesses scores are higher than the average scores for firms 
that issue standalone CSR reports every year, while CSR Strengths are lower. The 
ROA for these firms is 4.789, which is lower than firms that issue standalone CSR 
reports every year. Total Assets is significantly positively related to CSR Weaknesses, 
while Debt-to-Assets is significantly positively related to CSR Strengths and Total 
CSR. ROA is not significantly related to any form of CSR.  
Table 3. 
Correlations for Firms that Issue Standalone CSR Reports in Some of the 
Years 
Variable Mean SD Total 
Assets 
Debt-to- 
Equity 
ROA CSR 
Weaknesses 
CSR 
Strengths 
Total Assets $8.183 $8,031           
Debt-to-
Assets 
53.2% .209 .504*         
ROA 4.789 6.304 .057 -.140       
CSR 
Weaknesses 
.652 .986 .223* .121 .082     
CSR Strengths 1.101 1.198 .163 .412* -.073 .240*   
Total CSR .449 1.357 -.019 .276* -.124 -.515* .708* 
*p < .01   
**p < .05 
Table 4 shows the mean, standard deviations and correlation statistics for firms that 
never issue standalone CSR reports. The average Total CSR, CSR Strengths, and 
CSR Weaknesses scores are -.140, .624, and .764 respectively. For all forms of 
CSR, the scores are higher for firms that issue standalone CSR reports every year 
compared to firms that never issue them. Compared to firms that issue standalone 
CSR reports in some of the years, total CSR and CSR Strengths for firms that don’t 
issue CSR reports are lower, while CSR Weaknesses are higher. ROA is 2.606, 
which is lower than for firms that issue standalone CSR every year or in some of the 
years. Only Total Assets is significantly positively related to CSR Strengths and 
Total CSR at p<.01, while Debt-to-Assets is significantly positively related to CSR 
Weaknesses at p<.01.  ROA is not significantly related to any form of CSR. 
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Hypothesis 1 Statistical Testing 
Hypothesis 1 predicts that when firm issues a standalone CSR report, they will have higher 
CSR scores than firms who do not issue a standalone CSR report.  Hypothesis 1 is tested using 
an independent t-test and is reported in Table 5. The results show that when a firm issues a 
standalone CSR report, Total CSR, CSR Strengths, and CSR Weaknesses are significantly 
higher, thus supporting Hypothesis 1. 
Table 4.  Correlations for Firms that Never Issue Standalone CSR Reports 
Variable Mean SD Total 
Assets 
Debt-to-
Assets 
ROA CSR 
Weaknesses 
CSR 
Strengths 
Total Assets $14,327 $57,726           
Debt-to-Assets 55.7% .220 .359*         
ROA 2.606 11.221 -.025 .020       
CSR 
Weaknesses 
.764 .791 -.000 .142* .067     
CSR Strengths .624 .872 .185* .044 -.046 -.054   
Total CSR -.140 1.209 .133* -.061 -.077 -.694* .757* 
*p < .01   
**p < .05 
Table 5. Results of T-test for Issuance Firms Who Issue Standalone CSR Reports 
versus Firms Who Do Not 
  Standalone Report 
CSR 
Issued 
Standalone Report 
CSR 
Not Issued 
Difference T Statistic 
CSR Strengths 1.222 .692 .530 6.384* 
CSR Weaknesses .937 .730 .207 2.782* 
Total CSR .285 -.038 .323 2.863* 
N 193 527     
*p < .01   
To further investigate whether there is a difference between firms that issue standalone 
CSR reports every year, firms that issue standalone CSR reports in some of the years, 
and firms that never issue standalone CSR reports, additional analysis was done.  
Hypothesis 1a predicts that firms who issue standalone CSR reports every year will 
have higher CSR scores than firms that issue standalone CSR reports in some years 
and firms that never issue standalone CSR reports. Hypothesis 1b predicts that firms 
that issue standalone CSR reports in some years will have higher CSR scores than 
firms that never issue standalone CSR reports. The hypothesis 1a and 1b is investigated 
with a one-way ANOVA where the frequency of issuing reports is the dependent 
variable and CSR scores are the independent variable. Tables 6 through 8 show the 
results of the ANOVA for Total CSR, CSR Strengths, and CSR Weaknesses, 
respectively. The results of the three different ANOVAs show that Total CSR, CSR 
Strengths, and CSR Weaknesses are significantly different between the three reporting 
groups.     
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For Total CSR, the Bonferroni test for multiple comparisons found a significant 
difference between firms that issue standalone CSR reports every year compared to 
firms that never issue standalone CSR reports, at p<.005, and between firms that issue 
standalone CSR reports in some of the years compared to firms that never issue 
standalone CSR reports, at p<.000. There is no significant difference between firms 
that issue standalone CSR reports every year compared to firms that issue standalone 
CSR reports in some of the years. 
For CSR Strengths, the Bonferroni test  for multiple comparisons found a significant 
difference between firms that issue standalone CSR reports every year compared to 
firms that never issue standalone CSR reports, at p<.000, and between firms that issue 
standalone CSR reports in some of the years compared to firms that never issue 
standalone CSR reports, at p<.000. There is no significant difference between firms 
that issue standalone CSR reports every year compared to firms that issue standalone 
CSR reports in some of the years. 
For CSR Weaknesses, the Bonferroni test for multiple comparisons found a significant 
difference between firms that issue standalone CSR reports every year compared to 
firms that never issue standalone CSR reports, at p<.022, and compared to firms that 
issue standalone CSR reports in some of the years, at p<.004. There is no significant 
Table 6. One Way ANOVA between Firms that Issue Reports Every Year, Some 
Years and Never: Total CSP 
Source SS df MS F 
Between Groups 44.792 2 22.396 12.74* 
Within Groups 1260.507 717 1.758   
Total 1305.298 710 1.815   
Table 7. One Way ANOVA between Firms that Issue Reports Every Year, Some 
Years and Never: CSR Strengths 
Source SS df MS F 
Between Groups 55.039 2 27.520 28.84* 
Within Groups 684.293 717 .954   
Total 739.332 710 1.029   
Table 8. One Way ANOVA between Firms that Issue Reports Every Year, Some 
Years and Never: Total CSR Weaknesses 
Source SS df MS F 
Between Groups 8.726 2 4.363 5.58* 
Within Groups 260.335 717 .782   
Total 569.061 710 .791   
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difference between firms that never issue reports compared to firms that issue reports 
in some of the years. 
These results support Hypothesis 1 in that firms that issue standalone CSR reports have 
higher Total CSR, CSR Strengths, and CSR Weaknesses scores. Additionally, 
Hypothesis 1a is partially supported in that firms that issue standalone CSR reports 
every year have significantly higher Total CSR, CSR Strengths, and CSR Weaknesses 
than firms that never issue standalone CSR reports. There appears to be no significant 
difference in CSR Strengths and Total CSR between firms that issue standalone CSR 
reports every year and firms that issue these same reports in some of the years. Firms 
that issue standalone CSR reports every year have significantly higher CSR 
Weaknesses than firms that issue standalone CSR reports in some of the years5. 
Hypothesis 1b was also partially supported, as firms that issue standalone CSR reports 
in some of the years also had significantly higher Total CSR and CSR Strengths than 
firms that never issue standalone CSR reports. No significant difference was found 
between the two groups for CSR Weaknesses, though the average CSR Weaknesses 
was higher for firms that never issue standalone CSR reports. 
Hypothesis 2 Statistical Testing 
Hypothesis 2 predicts that firms that issue standalone CSR reports will have a strong 
relationship between CSR and financial performance than firms that do not issue 
standalone CSR reports. Hypothesis 2a predicts that firms that issue standalone reports 
each year will have a stronger relationship between CSR and financial performance 
than firms that issue standalone CSR reports in some of the years or never issue 
standalone CSR reports. Hypothesis H2b predicts that firms that issue standalone CSR 
reports some of the time will have a stronger relationship between CSR and financial 
performance than those who do not ever issue standalone CSR reports. Panel data 
analysis is used to investigate these hypotheses as we have cross-sectional and time 
series data. To control for the potential confounding effects found in other research, all 
panel data analysis controls for size, financial leverage, profitability and industry. A 
one-year lag between the FP performance independent variable and the dependent 
variable of CSR is used to be consistent with prior research. 
Tables 9 through 12 present the results of our three panel data regressions comparing 
firms that issue reports every year to firms that issue reports in some of the years. Our 
panel data analysis includes Total CSR, CSR Strengths, and CSR Weaknesses, lagged 
one year, as our dependent variables and the independent variables of ROA, Report 
and the interaction term of ROA*Report  as well as controls variables for size, SIC 
code, and leverage. Table 9 shows the panel data analysis between firms that report 
standalone CSR reports and firms that do not, where the dummy variable is 1 in the 
year a firm issued a standalone CSR report and 0 otherwise. The results show no 
significant relationship between any form of CSR and ROA as the independent 
variable of ROA*Report; the relationship is insignificant in all cases. 
5  These results were also confirmed through independent t-test.  
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Table 10 shows the panel data analysis between firms that issue reports all the time 
and firms that issue reports some of the time. For Total CSR and CSR Strengths, the 
interaction term of ROA*Report was insignificant. For CSR Weaknesses, though the 
interaction term of ROA*Report was negatively significant, no statement can be made 
as the panel data model was insignificant. 
Table 9. Panel Data Analysis 
Firms that issue Standalone CSR Reports in a Year Compared to Firms that Do 
Not Issue: Standalone CSR Reports in a Year 
Dependent Total CSR CSR Strengths CSR Weaknesses 
Independent       
     ROA  -.006 (-1.33) -.002(-0.42) .005(1.43) 
     Report -.075 (-0.52) -.051(-0.46) .008(0.07) 
     ROA*Report .014(1.07) .005(0.46) -.008(-0.85) 
Control       
     Debt-to-Assets -.206(0.61) .098(0.38) .377(1.56) 
     Total Assets .000(3.11)* .000(3.33)* -.000(-0.81) 
Adjusted R Square .1554 .1891 .1021 
Wald chi 45.71* 34.04* 28.83** 
Number of Observations 720 720 720 
Number of Companies 120 120 120 
Firm specific intercepts not reported. 
  *p < .01   
  **p < .05 
Table 10. Panel Data Analysis 
Firms that Issue Standalone CSR Reports Every Year Compared to Firms that  
Issue Standalone: CSR Reports in Some of the Years 
Dependent Total CSR CSR Strengths CSR Weaknesses 
Independent       
     ROA  -.016 (-0.99) -.003(-0.27) .004(1.97) 
     Report -.064 (-1.29) .045(0.13) .448(1.97)** 
     ROA*Report .033(1.31) -.006(-0.29) -0.300(-1.84)*** 
Control       
     Debt-to-Assets -.961(-0.95) -.469(-0.63) -.049(0.71) 
     Total Assets .000(2.03)** .000(1.27) -.000(-1.12) 
Adjusted R Square .1606 .1729 .0873 
Wald chi 21.36** 16.35 11.45 
Number of Observations 270 270 270 
Number of Companies 45 45 45 
Firm specific intercepts not reported. 
  *p < .01   
  **p < .05 
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Table 11 shows the panel data analysis between firms that issue reports all the time and 
firms that never issue standalone CSR reports. For Total CSR and CSR Strengths, the 
interaction term of ROA*Report was insignificant. For CSR Weaknesses, though, the 
interaction term of ROA*Report was negatively significant at p<.01, indicating that 
firms who issue standalone CSR reports every year have a stronger negative 
relationship between ROA and CSR Weaknesses. Thus the firms with higher 
profitability have lower CSR Weaknesses. These results provide partial support for 
Hypothesis 1a. 
Table 11. Panel Data Analysis 
Firms that Issue Standalone CSR Reports Every Year Compared to Firms that  
Never Issue Standalone CSR Reports 
Dependent Total CSR CSR Strengths CSR Weaknesses 
Independent       
     ROA -.006 (-1.27) -.001(-0.25) .005(1.66) 
     Report .375 (1.17) .828(3.72)* .455(2.10)** 
     ROA*Report .023 (1.31) -.009(-0.72) -0.32(-2.66)* 
Control       
     Debt-to-Assets -.311(-0.89) -.072(-0.28) .268(1.13) 
     Total Assets .000(2.60)* .000(2.19)** -.000(-1.70) 
Adjusted R Square .2468 .2957 .1734 
Wald chi 57.16* 52.31* 48.00* 
Number of Observations 582 582 582 
Number of Companies 97 97 97 
Firm-specific intercepts not reported. 
*p < .01   
**p < .05 
Table 12 shows the panel data analysis between firms that issue reports some of the 
time and firms that never issue standalone CSR reports.  For Total CSR, CSR 
Strengths, and CSR Weaknesses, the interaction term of ROA*Report was 
insignificant, indicating no support for Hypothesis 2b.   
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Summary and Conclusion 
This research provides insight into the reasons why firms choose to issue standalone 
CSR reports in Canada.  The theoretical perspectives of signaling theory and 
legitimacy theory are used to analyze two different potential explanations in 
considering whether firms use standalone CSR reports as a means to manipulate 
stakeholders’ perceptions of a firm’s pro-social and environment actions through 
greenwashing or if they use the reports to signal their commitment to and performance 
of social and environmental actions. 
Both signaling theory and legitimacy theory suggest that the CSR scores associated 
with voluntary reporting will be positively biased. However, depending upon the 
theoretical explanation used to base our understanding there are different implications 
for the bias inherent in CSR. Signaling theory suggests that firms that choose to 
engage in issuing these standalone reports will fairly report their pro-social and 
environmental information, but only those firms with “good news” would choose to 
voluntarily report. Legitimacy theory would suggest that individual firms would be 
overly positive about their pro-social and environmental actions and avoid reporting 
negative social and environment actions, thus biasing their reporting.  Therefore, 
legitimacy theory suggests that standalone CSR reports would be positively biased, 
providing theoretical support for greenwashing. 
Our results show that Canadian firms issuing standalone CSR reports every year have 
significantly higher Total CSR, CSR Strengths, and CSR Weaknesses than firms that 
never issue standalone reports. Additionally, firms that issue standalone CSR reports 
Table 12. Panel Data Analysis 
Firms that Issue Standalone CSR Reports in Some of the Years Compared to 
Firms that Never Issue Standalone CSR Reports 
Dependent Total CSR CSR Strengths CSR Weaknesses 
Independent       
     ROA -.006 (-1.18) -.001(-0.24) .004(1.47) 
     Report .676 (2.35)** .584(2.67)* -.101(-0.54) 
     ROA*Report -.011 (-0.76) -.004(-0.36) .007(0.70) 
Control       
     Debt-to-Assets -.265(-0.79) -.091(-0.34) .257(1.09) 
     Total Assets .000(1.28) .000(0.88) -.000(-0.77) 
Adjusted R Square .1756 .1836 .1263 
Wald chi 34.68* 25.64** 29.66* 
Number of Observations 588 588 588 
Number of Companies 98 98 98 
Firm-specific intercepts not reported. 
*p < .01   
**p < .05 
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in some years have higher CSR Strengths and Total CSR than firms that never issue 
standalone reports. These results are consistent with the signaling perspective, as it 
suggests that firms issuing these standalone CSR reports will have higher CSR scores 
than firms who do not. Firms may use standalone CSR reports to communicate that 
they are good by providing voluntarily transparent information and support of their 
good behavior to stakeholders who cannot necessarily distinguish between good and 
bad corporate citizens (Gugerty, 2009).  As signaling theory suggests, “Good” firms 
incur the cost of issuing voluntarily standalone CSR reports to signal that they are good 
corporate citizens. This may suggest that these standalone CSR reports disclose 
information that stakeholders can rely upon. These results are consistent with prior 
literature that suggests that a key motivation for companies issuing these reports is due 
to reputation enhancement (PricewaterhouseCoopers, 2002; KPMG International, 
2008).  
Our results also show a stronger association between CSR and ROA on the measures 
of CSR Weaknesses. We found that firms who issue standalone CSR reports every 
year had a stronger negative relationship between CSR Weaknesses and ROA at the 
p<.01 level when compared to firms that never issued standalone reports and to firms 
that issued standalone reports in some of the years. Again, our findings for firms that 
issue standalone CSR reports every year are consistent with a signaling theory and are 
a signal of a well-run company. Our findings support Orlitzky’s (2008) argument that a 
relationship between ROA and CSR could reflect enhanced organizational 
commitment to CSR and to enhanced profitability. Interestingly, when comparing 
firms that issue standalone CSR reports some of the time to firms that never issue 
standalone CSR reports,we found no significant relationship. 
Our results suggest the importance of Canadian firms issuing standalone CSR reports 
to signal their superior commitment to social responsibility actions. These results may 
provide incentive, benefit, and rational for “good CSR” firms who presently do not 
issue these reports to begin doing so. Additionally, these findings provide some insight 
into the debate of mandatory CSR disclosures in Canada by suggesting that firms with 
superior CSR performance appear to be facilitating stakeholders’ assessment of their 
CSR performance through the voluntary provision of a standalone CSR Report while 
firms with poor CSR performance are not. Thus, for stakeholders to obtain adequate 
CSR disclosure, these results provide evidence for requiring mandatory CSR disclosure 
for all firms. 
However, future research is needed in determining the benefits that firms perceive in 
their decision to issue standalone CSR reports and whether there is a need or 
stakeholder benefit for the standardization of these reports. Limitations to this research 
include the use of CSID Ratings, which are determined by an independent firm 
(Chatterji and Levine, 2006; Chatterji, Levine, and Toffel, 2009; Orlitzky and 
Swanson, 2008; Porter and Kramer, 2006). Additionally, this research has limitations 
associated with the measures, methodology, and sample size, similar to all research.     
22 Lois. S. Mahoney / Issues in Social and Environmental Accounting 1/2 (2012) 4-25                 
 
References 
Adams, C. (2002). Internal Organizational factors influencing corporate social and 
ethical reporting: Beyond current theorizing. Accounting, Auditing and 
Accountability Journal, 15 (2), 223-250. 
Alexander, G., & Buchholz, R.  (1978). Corporate social responsibility and stock 
market performance.  Academy of Management Journal, 21(3), 479-86. 
Ballou, B., Heitger, D., Landes, C. E., & and Adams, M.  (2006). The future of 
corporate sustainability reporting. Journal of Accountancy, 202(6), 65-74. 
Baron, D. (2001). Corporate social responsibility and integrated strategy. Journal of 
Economics and Management Strategy, 10(1), 2001, 7-45. 
Bebbington, J., Larrinaga, C., & Moneva, J. M. (2008). Corporate social reporting and 
reputation risk management.  Accounting, Auditing & Accountability 
Journal, 21(3), 337-361.   
Brown, N., & Deegan, C. (1998). The public disclosure of environmental performance 
information – A dual test of media agenda setting theory and LT. Accounting 
and Business Research, 29(1), 21-41. 
Chatterji, A. K., & Levine, D. (2006). Breaking down the wall of codes: Evaluating 
non-Financial performance measurement. California Management Review, 
48(2), 29-51. 
Chatterji, A. K., Levine, D., &Toffel, M. W. (2009). How well do social ratings actu-
ally measure corporate social responsibility? Journal of Economics and 
Management Strategy, 18(1), 125-169. 
Cho, C., Freedman, M., & Patten, D. (2012). Corporate disclosure of environmental 
capital expenditures: A test of alternative theories. Accounting, Auditing and 
Accountability Journal, 25(3), 486-507 
Cho, C., Guidry, R., Hageman, A. M., & Patten, D. M. (2012). Do actions speak 
louder than words? An empirical investigation of corporate environmental 
reputation. Accounting, Organizations, and Society, 37(1), 14-25.  
Cho, C., & Patten, M.  (2007). The role of environmental disclosures as tools of 
legitimacy: A research note. Accounting, Organizations and Society, 32(7-
8), 639-647.  
Cho, C., Patten, D., & Roberts, R. (2006). Corporate political strategy: An 
examination of the relation between political expenditures, environmental 
performance, and environmental disclosure. Journal of Business Ethics, 67
(2), 139-154.  
Cho, C., Patten, D., & Roberts, R. (2010).The language of U.S. environmental 
disclosure. Accounting, Organizations and Society, 35 (4), 431-443. 
Clarkson, P., Li, Y., Richardson, G. D., & Vasvari, F. P. (2011). Does it really pay to 
be green? Determinants and consequences of proactive environmental 
                       Lois S. Mahoney / Issues in Social and Environmental Accounting 1/2 (2012) 4-25                             23 
 
strategies. Journal of Accounting and Public Policy, 30(2), 122-144. 
CorporateRegister.com. (2008). Which companies and reports feature in the GRI 
register? [Online] Available: http://www.corporat3434eregister.com/
aboutreports.html (June 26, 2008). 
Craighead, J., Magnan, M., & Thorne, L. (2004). The impact of mandated disclosure 
on performance-based CEO compensation. Contemporary Accounting 
Research, 21(2), 369-397. 
Crane, A., McWilliams, A., Matten, D., Moon, J., &  Siegel, D. (2008). The Oxford 
Handbook of Corporate Social Responsibility. New York: Oxford University 
Press (Pp. 568-575). 
Dawkins, C., & Ngunjiri, F.W. (2008). Corporate social responsibility reporting in 
South Africa: A descriptive and comparative analysis. Journal of Business 
Communication, 45(3), 289-307. 
Deegan, C., Rankin, M., & Tobin, J. (2002).  An examination of the corporate social 
and environmental disclosures of BHP from 1983-1997: A test of legitimacy 
theory. Accounting, Auditing & Accountability Journal, 15(3), 312-43. 
Erusalimsky, A., Gray, R., & Spence, C. (2006). Towards a more systematic study of 
standalone corporate social and environmental reporting: An exploratory 
pilot study of UK reporting.  Social & Environmental Accounting Journal, 26
(1), 12-19. 
Fauzi, H., Mahoney, L., and Rahman, A. A. (2007).  Institutional ownership and 
corporate social performance: Empirical evidence from Indonesian 
Companies.  Issues in Social and Environmental Accounting, 1(2), 334-347. 
Frost, G. F.  (2007). The introduction of mandatory environmental guidelines: 
Australian evidence.  Abacus, 43(2), 190-216. 
Gelb, D. S., & Strawser, J. S. (2001). Corporate social responsibility and financial 
disclosures: An alternative explanation for increased disclosure. Journal of 
Business Ethics, 33, 1-13. 
Graves, S. B., & Waddock, S. A. (1994). Institutional owners and corporate social 
performance. Academy of Management Journal, 37(4), 1034-1046. 
Gray, R. (2006). Does sustainability reporting improve corporate behavior? Wrong 
question?Wrong time? Accounting and Business Research, 65-88. 
Greening, D. W., & Turban, D. B. (2000). Corporate social performance as a 
competitive advantage in attracting a quality workforce. Business and 
Society, 39(3), 254-280. 
Greer J., & Bruno, K. (1996). Greenwash: The reality behind corporate 
environmentalism. Penang Malaysia: The Apex Press. 
Gugerty, M. K. (2009). Signaling virtue, voluntary accountability programs among 
nonprofit organizations. Poly Sci, 42, 243-273. 
24 Lois. S. Mahoney / Issues in Social and Environmental Accounting 1/2 (2012) 4-25                 
 
Guidry, R. B. & Patten, D. (2010). Market reaction to the first-time issuance of stand-
alone corporate social responsibility reports. Sustainability Accounting, Man-
agement and Policy Journal 1(1), 33-50. 
Healy, P. & Palepu, K. G. (2001).  Information asymmetry, corporate disclosure, and 
the capital markets: A review of the empirical disclosure literature. Journal of 
Accounting & Economics, 31(1-3), 405-440.  
KPMG (2008). KPMG International survey of corporate responsibility reporting 2008.  
Amsterdam: KPMG Global Sustainability Services and University of 
Amsterdam.  
             (2011). KPMG International survey of corporate responsibility reporting 
2011. Switzerland: KPMG International Cooperative. 
Li, Y., Richardson, G., Thornton, D. B. & Hughes, J. S. (1997). Corporate disclosure 
of environmental liability information: Theory and evidence. Contemporary 
Accounting Research, 14(3), 435-474. 
Lindblom, C. K. (1994). The implications of organizational legitimacy for 
corporatesocial performance and disclosure. Paper presented at the Critical 
Perspectives onAccounting Conference, New York. 
Lizzeri, A. (1999). Information revelation and ertification intermediaries. Journal of 
Economics, 30(2), 214-231. 
Lyon, T., & Maxwell, J. (2011). Greenwash: Corporate environmental disclosure under 
threat of audit. Journal of Economics & Management Strategy, 20, 3-41. 
Mahoney, L. & Roberts, R. (2007). Corporate social performance, financial 
performance and institutional ownership in Canadian firms. Accounting 
Forum, 31(3), 233-253. 
Mahoney L. & Thorne, L. (2006). An examination of the structure of executive 
compensation and corporate social responsibility: A Canadian investigation. 
Journal of Business Ethics, 69(2), 149-162. 
Marin, L., Ruiz, S., & Rubio, A. (2009).The role of identity salience in the effects of 
corporate social responsibility on consumer behavior.Journal of Business 
Ethics, 84(1), 65-78. 
Michael Jantzi Research Associates Inc. (2000). Social and environmental rating 
criteria for MJRA company profiles, Toronto, Ontario. 
Milgrom, P.  (1981). Good news and bad news:  Representation theorems and 
applications. Bell Journal of Economics, 12(2), 380-391. 
Murray, S. (2005).  Nike makes thex step to transparency. Financial Times, April 12. 
Nike-Kasky Case. 27. (2002).  Cal 4th 939, 45 P.3d 243 119 Cal Pptr 2 296. 
Orlitzky, M. (2008). Corporate social performance and financial performance: A 
research  Synthesis in Crane, A., A. McWilliams, D. Matten, J. Moon, D.  
Siegel, (Eds.)  (2008). The Oxford Handbook of Corporate Social 
                       Lois S. Mahoney / Issues in Social and Environmental Accounting 1/2 (2012) 4-25                             25 
 
Responsibility. New York: Oxford University Press. 
Orlitzky, M., & Swanson, D. L. (2008). Toward integrative corporate citizenship: Re-
search advances in corporate social performance. London: Palgrave Mac-
millan. 
Patten, D. (1992).  Intra-industry environmental disclosures in response to the Alaskan 
oil spill: A note on legitimacy theory. Accounting, Organizations and 
Society, 17(5), 471-475. 
Patten, D. M. (2002). The relation between environmental performance and 
environmental disclosure: A research note. Accounting, Organizations and 
Society, 27(2002), 763–773. 
Porter, M. E. & Kramer, M. R. (2006). Strategy and society: The link between com-
petitive advantage and corporate social responsibility. Harvard Business Re-
view, 84(12), 78-92. 
PricewaterhouseCoopers. (2002). 2002 Sustainability Survey Report, New York: 
PricewaterhouseCoopers.  
Roman, R. M., Hayibor, S. & Agle, B. R. (1999). The relationship between social and 
financial performance. Business and Society, 38(1), 109-125. 
Sen, S., Bhattacharya, C. B., & Korschun, D. (2006). The role of corporate social 
responsibility in strengthening multiple stakeholder relationships: A field 
experiment. Journal of the Academy of Marketing Science, 34(2), 158–166. 
Srivastava, J. N. & Lurie, L. (2001).  A consumer perspective on price-matching 
refund policies: Effect on price perceptions and search behavior. Journal of 
Consumer Research, 28, 296-307. 
Thorne, L., Mahoney, L., & Bobek, D. (2010). A comparison of the association 
between corporate social responsibility and executive compensation: U.S. 
versus Canada. Research on Professional Responsibility and Ethics in 
Accounting, 14, 26-36. 
Toms, J. S. (2002). Firm resources, quality signals and the determinants of corporate 
environmental reputation: Some UK evidence. British Accounting Review, 34
(3), 257-282. 
Turban, D. B. & Greening, D.W. (1997). Corporate social performance and 
organizational attractiveness to prospective employees. Academy of 
Management Journal, 40(3), 658–672. 
Van der Laan, G., Van Ees, H. & Van Witteloostuijn, A. (2008).  Corporate social and 
financial performance: An extended stakeholder theory, and empirical test 
with accounting measures.  Journal of Business Ethics, 79, 299-310. 
Verrecchia, R. (1983). Discretionary disclosure. Journal of Accounting and 
Economics, 5(3), 179–194. 
Waddock, S.A., & Graves, S.B.  (1997). The corporate social performance-financial 
performance link. Strategic Management Journal, 18(4), 303-319. 
